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Walter Kasper’s Religious Quest for Jesus Christ 
Glenn Morrison 
The University of Notre Dame, Australia 
 
Walter Kasper brings to light the religious quest for Jesus Christ in a secular, 
historical world. Taking up the turn towards anthropology and demythologisation, he 
sets out to rationally articulate the logic of faith in which Jesus is recognized as the 
Christ. Pursuing this quest, he develops a theological discourse on freedom, 
redemption, and self-transcendence.  
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he quest for meaning and truth pierces both our secular and religious worlds. The 
Christian truth of what gives life to our existence and reality, namely, that Jesus is the 
Christ, is one that constantly needs to be re-iterated in our increasingly secular and 
technological world. This article will focus on Walter Kasper’s ‘Religious Quest for Jesus 
Christ’ as a means of renewing the logic of faith for today. To this end, I will use both a 
phenomenological and an ontological lens. Accordingly, I will refer, in some instances, to the 
philosophies of Martin Heidegger and Emmanuel Levinas, two philosophers in the twentieth 
century who have been a major influence on Christian theologians. For the most part, my 




Emmanuel Levinas, which will proffer, if you like, a ‘Levinasian’ reading of Kasper’s 
‘Religious Quest for Jesus Christ.’
1
 
At specific instances, Levinas would direct his writings towards Christianity and 
theology, so as to draw parallels between his own thinking and Christian life and thought. In 
his essay, for example, ‘Philosophy, Justice and Love,’ he writes:  
 
When I speak to a Christian, I always quote Matthew 25; the relation to God is 
presented there as a relation to another person. It is not a metaphor: in the other, there 
is a real presence of God. In my relation to the other, I hear the Word of God. It is not 
a metaphor; it is not only extremely important, it is literally true. I’m not saying that 
the other is God, but that in his or her Face I hear the Word of God. 
 
Granted that the way in which ‘God reverberates’
2
 in the Other’s face is an enigmatic 
phenomenon beyond our knowing, we are nonetheless commanded and ordained to a relation 
of responsibility for the other.
3
  
                                                 
1
 See Emmanuel Levinas, ‘Philosophy, Justice, and Love’ in Emmanuel Levinas, Entre Nous. 
On Thinking-of-the-Other, trans. Michael B. Smith and Barbara Harshav (New York: 
Columbia University, 1998), 110. 
2
 Levinas, ‘Philosophy, Justice and Love,’ 110. 
3
 Levinas writes: ‘The consciousness of responsibility immediately imposed is certainly not 
in the nominative, it is rather in the accusative …. It is in that sense that I can say that 
consciousness, subjectivity, no longer have first place in their relationship to the other.’ We 
can see here that Levinas gives priority to ethical transcendence or alterity (otherness). In a 
Levinasian sense, alterity or otherness refers to being made responsible by the Other to such a 




Kasper’s religious quest for Jesus Christ takes us on a theological journey that 
penetrates the world of secular reason and rationality. The highpoint in this journey is the 
affirmation that Jesus is the Christ. This resounding logic, explored in Kasper’s Jesus the 
Christ, remains an urgent and defining one for today. Jesus the Christ is a classic, not only in 
the field of Christology, but also in Christian theology as a whole. It stands amongst such 




Together, Kasper, von Balthasar, and Rahner have enhanced Christian theology 
through imagination, creativity, and vision. Whereas, for example, Rahner develops a 
theological anthropology, and von Balthasar a theo-logical logic, Kasper develops a logic of 
faith in search of a contemporary critical way of speaking of God. Given that von Balthasar 
grounds his theology and discourse on truth in theological aesthetics, it might appear that 
Kasper’s discussion is deficient, since he may appear to be forgetful of the important 
category of the beautiful. Von Balthasar prioritises the philosophical transcendental of beauty 
so that we might truly have the eyes of faith to see the glorious form of Christ in the paschal 
mystery and the Trinity. Kasper’s contribution, however, is equally appealing. He articulates 
                                                                                                                                                        
to sacrifice itself to the point of expiation for the Other. See Levinas, ‘Philosophy, Justice and 
Love,’ 111. 
4
 Indicating and acknowledging the contribution of Raher and von Balthasar, Kasper writes: 
‘In German-speaking theology, it was Karl Rahner and Has Urs von Balthasar above all who 
set the standard for the break-through in our century; and this was so even though their ways 
were later to part to some degree – or perhaps for that very reason’ (Walter Kasper, Theology 
and Church [New York: Crossroad, 1989], 1). 
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the quest for the person of Christ with a logic and rationale that uncovers the inner truth of 
human existence and freedom.  
We might ask what drives Kasper to develop a logic of faith and salvation that 
touches the heart of human history, freedom, and existence. It is faith and hope in the word of 
salvation that Jesus is the Christ. Whereas von Balthasar underlines, dramatically, the sense 
of Christ’s mission being one with his person in God and as God, Kasper reflects upon the 
quest for Jesus the Christ with a contemporary, historical, and personal urgency that 
underscores a salvific and kerygmatic concern for our present human condition. 
Kasper diagnoses a critical crisis in secular society. Having fallen into relativism and 
an understanding of the world that is centred on subjectivity, society has created egoistically 
an idol, namely, its self as the measure of all things. Experience, freedom, and history are but 
modes of being-for-oneself. Wary of the enlightenment’s self-certainty and its ultimate fall 
into irrationality, Kasper brings to light the very truth that Jesus is the Christ. To this end, he 
connects Christology to soteriology. He utilises, furthermore, the language of ontology and 
phenomenology, adding to them aspects of existentialism. Such an approach, in some 
respects, bears a resemblance to Heidegger’s Being and Time. Kasper, however, inverts or re-
visions Heidegger’s search for the meaning of being by translating it from a secular context 
into one of faith. Whereas Heidegger may be read as secularizing theology in Being and 
Time, Kasper is concerned with not reducing theology to a particular philosophical system, 
but in raising philosophical and theological discourse to a new search for truth, that takes the 
secularised world as his point of departure.  
Kasper’s ‘Religious Quest of Jesus Christ’ is a journey towards the wisdom of faith. 
In wholly different terms, Levinas searches for an idea of God beyond being and 
thematization, that is, for the possibility of pronouncing the word God beyond, what he sees 
as, the betrayal that accompanies ontological statement. Levinas emphasises also that 
 
 5 
‘philosophy is the wisdom of love at the service of love.’
5
 At this juncture Kasper and 
Levinas may be together at a crossroads. Given that the movement from philosophy to 
theology is borne by understanding and faith, we can affirm that for Kasper ‘theology is the 
wisdom of love at the service of love.’ In a statement, for example, that appears to draw upon 
the locus of alterity, Kasper states: ‘The Christian freedom which perfects human freedom 
can even less be individualistically interpreted. It is freedom which proves itself in love (Gal 




Kasper’s philosophical-theological writings express a faith in search of wisdom, love, 
and service. Moreover, his message testifies to an unveiling of the human person before God: 
that our being (existence) and our experience (consciousness, emotions, perceptions, and 
desires) find fulfilment in self-transcendence, a state in which we find hope and ultimate 
meaning in Jesus the Christ. In mapping out his quest, Kasper considers the logic of faith 
with respect to four areas of the modern world’s own quest for meaning: a secularised world, 
demythologisation, anthropology, and finally history. 
 
The Challenge from a Secularised world  
 
Kasper’s theology of ‘the Religious Quest for Jesus Christ’ begins with a 
programmatic and compelling statement of faith: ‘The confession that “Jesus is the Christ” is 
the answer to the question of salvation and redemption.’
7
 This is the whole theological logic 
                                                 
5
 Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence, trans. Alphonso Lingis 
(Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: Duquesne University, 1999), 162. 
6
 See Kasper, Theology and Church, 69-70. 
7
 Walter Kasper, Jesus the Christ, trans. V. Green (London: Burns & Oates, 1977), 41. 
 
 6 
that underlines the religious quest for Jesus Christ in a secularised world. Immediately, we 
note a kerygmatic concern that takes to heart the fundamental question from Matthew’s 
gospel: ‘Are you the one who is to come, or shall we look for another?’ (Matt 11:3). 
Underlying Kasper’s approach is a challenge to Rahner’s anthropological turn to the subject, 
and particularly, to his emphasis on an implicit assent of faith in the idea of ‘anonymous 
Christianity.’ We can see Kasper’s concern that such an embryonic assent of faith might not 
only be reductive, but also skewed in its anthropology. If God is indeed personal, then it is a 
personal ‘yes’ in faith that is the only appropriate response to him. 
The aim of Kasper’s philosophical-theological work is to present a logic of faith that 
is not only comprehensible to the modern secular mindset, but acts as a bridge to the world of 
self-transcendence and to life in Christ.
8
 Hence, it is not surprising that he presents his 
position with a framework that is typical of the enlightenment mind-set, namely, that of 
question and answer: ‘The confession that “Jesus is the Christ” is the answer to the question 
of salvation and redemption.’
9
 This framework does, however, raise the issue of whether 
Kasper himself runs the risk of falling into an enlightenment reduction. Furthermore, from a 
                                                 
8
 For Levinas the thought of God ought to be included in philosophical discourse. 
‘Philosophical discourse … should be able to include God – of whom the Bible speaks – if 
this God does have a meaning … the God of the Bible signifies the beyond being, 
transcendence’ (Emmanuel Levinas, Basic Philosophical Writings, ed. by Adriaan T. 
Peperzak, Simon Critchley and Robert Bernasconi [Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 
1996], 130). For Levinas, the God of the Bible has a meaning for philosophy, namely, 
transcendence.  
9
 Kasper, Jesus the Christ, 41. 
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post-metaphysical perspective, the challenge is to ensure that ‘being’ is not forgetful of the 
theological modes of truth, such as peace, justice, mercy, kenosis, expiation, and humility.
10
 
We may, no doubt, discover limitations in Kasper’s quest, but let us first examine 
what he has to offer. We will find that he sets out to re-think the enlightenment, and in doing 
so demythologise its very limitations. Whilst he may share some of the concerns of the 
Frankfurt School of Critical Theory with its project of testing the principles of the 
enlightenment, Kasper is, nonetheless, concerned primarily with the quest of witnessing to 
Christ today. This concern reflects experience in the sense of being a journey and a 
progressive learning. In Kasper’s writing experience is constantly directed by theological 
truth. 
Kasper’s concern is first and foremost theo-logical. He analyses and challenges the 
secular world to be more mindful of ‘a Christian and religious emphasis.’
11
 He constructs, to 
borrow von Balthasar’s terminology, a ‘theo-logic,’ that is, an articulation of his own 
perspective, which is to rationally testify to the Word/word of God in a secular world. 
 
Man wants to assess the world and treat it in a worldly way. He wants to reach a 
rational insight into the immanent objective structures of politics, economics, science, 
and so on, and to orientate his activity accordingly. The ‘absolute’ and ultimate 
questions which cannot be solved in this way are largely counted as meaningless and 
                                                 
10
 I am taking here a Levinasian perspective, in which to have a sense in being one is required 
to be otherwise than being. For a description of Levinas’ complex and ambiguous 
understanding of ‘having a sense, ’ see Levinas, Basic Philosophical Writings, 64, 122-123 
and Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence, trans. by Alphonso 
Lingis (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: Duquesne University, 1999), 16, 49, 108, 144-162.  
11
 Kasper, Jesus the Christ, 41. 
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Kasper’s critique of society defines the concerns of our post-modern condition in which we 
so easily lose ourselves both in relativism and in a naïve and reductive rationalism. In such a 
context the search for the transcendent has been more or less abandoned in favour of other 
more ‘meaningful’ this-worldly (secular) pursuits, such as those of economics and science. 
Kasper’s concern is to awaken, or even surprise, the secularised world, through rational 
argument, to its real meaning and truth (the very Logos of God). When humanity assesses 
and treats the world from within its own parameters, the tyranny and ‘bad faith’ of public 
opinion clouds the religious quest. We can, as a result, become forgetful of one another’s 
needs and fears, and subservient to both a depersonalised existence and a reality that has 
become absurd for us.  
In Levinasian terms this could be characterised as an ‘existence without existents.’
13
 
In describing being in terms of fear and horror, as an anonymous and depersonalised state of 
existence, Levinas’ phrase, there is (il y a), connotes this ‘existence without existents.’
14
 As 
the horror that strips consciousness of its subjectivity, the there is depicts a frightening 
ambiguity: the inability to ascertain the presence or absence of anything.
15
 Metaphorically, he 
                                                 
12
 Ibid., 41. 
13
 Emmanel Levinas, Existence and Existents, trans. Alphonso Lingis (London: Kluwer 
Academic, 1995), 57. ‘Existence without existents’ refers also to the experience of existence 




 Ibid., 64. 
 
 9 
aptly describes the experience of the there is as the horror of the night.
16
 Appropriating 
Levinas’ analysis of the there is, we could suggest that Kasper’s quest is a religious one that 
ultimately demands that we be vigilant against the tendency to ground human freedom in 
positions (such as secularism, ideology, utopian ideals, etc) that will ultimately alienate the 
human person from existence. 
Kasper diagnoses the world’s fundamental problem by means of the category of 
subjectivity, or more accurately, egoistical subjectivity: ‘Subjectivity means that man posits 
himself as the starting-point and measure for understanding reality as a whole.’
17
 This, for 
Kasper, represents a reduction of divine being to human being. In general, he observes, there 
is a tendency in society to reduce the other (person) to one’s own perceptions, desires, and 
needs, without reference to any transcendent truth. To avoid the vicious circle of egoism is 
the hope that is offered by salvation. For Kasper such exclusive subjectivity leads ultimately 
to an objectivity (knowledge) in which science and technology are the dominant voices. This 
is to leave reason without the support of faith, and a series of unsolved problems without an 
appreciation of the legitimate place of mystery.  
To present the world as a problem to be completely solved is already to deny the 
place, and importance, of mystery. ‘Man believes that he is in the process of increasingly 
understanding the real causes of things, and that he is coming more and more to master and 
control them.’
18
 We can see that Kasper is wary of humanity’s arrogance in presuming 
absolute power over the world and things. The paradox is that the more powerful we become, 
the more powerless we actually are, as we refrain from defining ourselves in terms of 
                                                 
16
 Ibid., 62. 
17





mystery. Thus, we can begin to understand and appreciate Kasper’s critique of subjectivity 
and its accompanying reductionism. 
As a means of articulating the Christ event, Kasper favours the category of 
emancipation as opposed to subjectivity. Over against Bernard Lonergan’s observation that 
‘genuine objectivity is the fruit of authentic subjectivity,’
19
 Kasper’s perspective on 
subjectivity appears rather negative. Presently, moreover, many Christian theologians find 
Emmanuel Levinas’ emphasis on ethical subjectivity to be of significant import, in that it 
releases the subject from being defined by means of an anonymous and depersonalising 
objectivity (in the form of knowledge and self-interest). Levinas aims at an ethical 
subjectivity that is beyond any form of philosophical objectivity. Truth does not depend on 
objectivity and the meaning of being in general, since it is now much more a testimony of 
responsibility for the other, which goes beyond the conatus (effort) of philosophical 
intelligence.
20
 Nonetheless, Kasper’s logic is important since it takes us along his quest from 
(egoistic) subjectivity towards emancipation, so that we might take the next important step, 
namely, to the category of redemption. 
Kasper observes that ‘it is a fundamental question for modern Christology to decide 
the relation between redemption understood in a Christian perspective and emancipation 
understood as the modern age understands it.’
21
 We are faced with two competing categories: 
the theological category of redemption and the historico-philosophical category of 
emancipation. The question then is how we can make the religious category of redemption 
comprehensible, given the historical, political, economic and social conditioning that is 
                                                 
19
 See Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology, 2nd ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto, 
1996), 292. 
20
 See Levinas, Basic Philosophical Writings, 102-103. 
21
 Kasper, Jesus the Christ, 43. 
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associated with the category of emancipation. In contrast to Bultmann’s and Rahner’s 
previous attempts, Kasper sets out to transpose the category of emancipation for theology, 
and hence give it a religious foundation for a secularised world.  
 
The Demythologization of Belief in Christ  
 
According to Kasper, secular thought tends to demythologise Christian faith and its 
mysteries in a destructive way by presenting the content of faith as mythological and 
uninspiring for today. In effect, secular thought severs Christian faith from the discourse on 
truth in the name of purifying human reason from ‘mythic’ conceptions.  
  
When human freedom and maturity become the dominant midpoint and criterion of 
thought, traditional religious ideas and convictions must appear mythological. The 
traditional faith in Jesus Christ has also incurred the suspicion of being mythological. 
… Surely, out of intellectual honesty and for the sake of a more genuine idea of God, 




Deconstructing and inverting the secular position, Kasper demythologises such secular logic 
so as to create a complementary discourse on meaning, in which faith in Jesus the Christ is 
articulated in the name of reason. If secular society’s intent is to portray the Christian God as 
‘primitive,’ ‘out-of-date,’ and as a cosmic ‘gap-filler,’ we might well understand Kasper’s 
concern in re-orientating Christian hermeneutics so that it is attentive to the danger of such 





negative demythologising, that interprets Christianity exclusively from within the categories 
of myth and mythology.
 23
  
The governing idea behind the demythologisation project, however, is not one of 
elimination, but of interpretation. The aim is to discover the meaning of the objective core of 
the event — ‘to reveal the lasting content and intention in a way appropriate to the modern 
mind.’
24
 But how ‘appropriate’ is this process, when a negative rationalization accompanies 
it? Given this problem, Kasper broadens the picture, observing that the roots of the 
demythologisation process are to be found in the context of humanity renewing its 
understanding of being (in the modes of existence and reality).  
 
The Meaning of Being 
 
Although Kasper does not deal specifically with the issue, we can see a development 
in the modern mind in its understanding of the meaning of being. By means of existentialism, 
anthropology, and ontological phenomenology, the modern mind has acquired the tools to 
                                                 
23
 Kasper defines myth as ‘the form of understanding proper to an out-of-date epoch of 
human history: the primitive era, or childhood, or mankind. In that epoch, man was not aware 
of the real causes of things, and therefore he saw supramundane and divine powers at work 
everywhere in the world an in history.’ Furthermore, according to Kasper, mythology is ‘the 
mode of thought and imagination which understands the divine in a worldly form, and the 
worldly in a divine form. God is the gap-filler, the dues ex machine, who replaces natural 
causes with miraculous and supernatural interventions. . . . The divine . . . can be experienced 





comprehend in new categories being’s modality of existence. This creates, additionally, a 
useful lens for interpreting various Christological developments since the enlightenment.  
We have, for example, a new framework for understanding the debate over the 
distinction between the Jesus of history and the Christ of faith. This debate may be seen as 
situated within a movement of understanding the meaning of being in terms of reality (the 
Jesus of history) and in terms of existence (the Christ of faith). The search for the meaning of 
being, carried through by thinkers such as D.F. Strauss and Albert Schweitzer, embraced the 
significance of reality (as we find in the eighteenth and nineteenth century quest for the 
historical Jesus). On the one hand, the search continued and evolved towards another aspect 
of being, namely, existence. Twentieth century theologians like Bultmann embraced the 
significance of existence so as to free the Christ of faith from false kerygmatic realities, 
which mythologise the Jesus of history. For Bultmann, the redemptive event was not a 
supernatural event, but a purely historical one.  
Against this framework of Christological development since the enlightenment in the 
search for the meaning of being, we may ask about the significance of Kasper’s Christology. 
Even though he points out, acknowledging Bultmann’s contribution, that ‘the 
demythologisation programme tries to accord with man’s changed understanding of reality,’
25
 
he also insists that a major concern of the demythologisation programme is that of 
understanding existence. Hence, it is not surprising that Kasper finds himself part of the very 
movement from reality to existence, as he reflects on Jesus Christ’s definitive interplay 
within human existence: 
 
Demythologisation is also acceptable in its positive aspect, as, that is to say, 
existential or anthropological interpretation. Revelation uses human language, which 





only reveals something when it reaches the hearer: when, that is, he understands it. 





Whilst Bultmann minimizes Christ’s historical kerygma and presence, for Kasper, 
God communicates the truth of revelation through the life, death, and risen presence of Jesus 
Christ. It is interesting that Kasper acknowledges the problem of language and touches on the 
post-modern concern of meaning and language. ‘We have to ask whether and how far 
theological discourse and discussion are really possible and meaningful.’
27
 Since the late 
twentieth century, the demythologisation program has begun to revise the category of being, 
as we find eminent Christian theologians such as David Ford, Michael Barnes, and Michael 
Purcell taking an interest in Emmanuel Levinas’ conception of ‘otherwise than Being or 
beyond essence.’
 28
 In many respects, the philosophical writings of Emmanuel Levinas 
attempt to demythologise the Heideggerian conception of being. Levinas writes at the 
beginning of his work, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, ‘to hear a God not 
contaminated by Being is a human possibility no less important and no less precarious than to 




                                                 
26
 Ibid., 46. 
27
 Ibid., 46. 
28
 David Ford, Self and Salvation: Being Transformed (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 
1999); Michael Barnes, Theology and the Dialogue of Religions (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002); and Michael Purcell, Mystery and Method: The Other in Rahner and 
Levinas (Milwaukee: Marquette University, 1998). 
29
 See Levinas, Otherwise than Being, xlviii. 
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Kasper’s theology is situated at a turning point between the enlightenment and a new 
post-modern era that pushes metaphysics toward a new understanding of the logos (the truth 
of being), where existence is understood primarily from the ethical point of view. The post-
modern ethic suggests that the more responsibility a person undertakes, paradoxically, the 
more is required of that person. Ultimately, we are called to be like God, that is, to take on a 
‘difficult freedom,’ where we are responsible for everything and everyone. In Levinasian 
terms, this difficult freedom is one of superindividuation and of a hyperbolic responsibility. 
Through this ‘individuation or superindividuation’ the self undergoes a certain fusion of 
identity with the suffering reality of the other. Levinas states cryptically: ‘I am an Other.’
30
  
Kasper’s theology of the quest for Jesus Christ is a necessary stepping stone and 
reminder for post-modern theology to keep to the truth that Jesus is the Christ. He underlines 
the urgency of the task of appropriate demythologization: ‘The biblical and church doctrine 
that Jesus was a true and complete man with a human intellect and human freedom, does not 
seem to prevail in the average Christian head.’
31
 We find him, thus stating, that 
‘demythologisation is not only permissible but necessary; precisely in order to disclose the 
authentic meaning of belief in Christ.’
32
 Accordingly, for Kasper, the task of preaching, 
teaching, and witnessing to the truth of Jesus Christ to the world is of prime importance for 
post-modern theology. 
Examining Kasper’s reflection on demythologisation, we see the importance of the 
positive ‘existential or anthropological interpretation.’ In more manageable terms, he touches 
on von Balthasar’s idea of Jesus Christ as the analogy of being par excellence, that is, Christ 
as the defining archetype in discovering our similarity with, and ever greater dissimilarity 
                                                 
30
 Ibid., 118. 
31





from, God or divine being. For Kasper, Christological statements tell us about human 
existence. But such theological statements always run the risk of falling into impersonal 
representations, proofs, and debates. 
 
The Risks of Theological Discourse 
 
Kasper sets out on a religious-theological quest to discover how God relates to 
humanity, and how the world might reveal God. In this a fundamental question is raised on 
the viability of theological discourse. ‘We have to ask whether and how far theological 
discourse and discussion are really possible and meaningful.’
33
 This is a vital question for 
which there is no ultimate answer – it is the same as asking: ‘What is the meaning of being?’ 
At once, Kasper’s religious quest is a search for a rational way of articulating God, whilst 
acknowledging the importance of transcendence and mystery.
34
 
In the quest for a logic of faith, Kasper describes the problems encountered by the 
‘emancipation, enlightenment and demythologisation movement of recent years,’
35
 such as 




 Levinas seeks also to explore the logos of God without thematizing God’s divinity. He 
speaks of the rather enigmatic idea of illeity to express how God commands the self in order 
to testify to his glory. In this sense theological language could be described as the gift of self 
for the other, that is in Levinasian terms, the un-thematizable sign of God’s trace (illeity), 
which orders and commands the self to a life of responsibility for the other. In such ethical 
transcendence, the self does not succumb to the temptation of consciousness to betray the 
divine word. This is because the gift of one’s soul (marked by God’s trace) coincides with 
sacrifice for the other. See Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 79, 147, 151, 162. 
35
 Kasper, Jesus the Christ, 47. 
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the realization of the Frankfurt School that the enlightenment itself ‘ran the risk of 
succumbing to irrationalism by itself becoming irrational.’
 36
 This too is a risk in Kasper’s 
theology, as he continues with his question and answer methodology. It is more accentuated 
in particular areas of his theology. 
Kasper falls into such a philosophising reductionism, when, for example, he 
emphasises that, ‘this “sym-pathetic” God as he reveals himself in Jesus Christ is the 
definitive answer to the question of theodicy.’
37
 For Kasper, God redeems suffering, removes 
its weakness, and transforms it into hope. Kenosis and suffering are not the last words; it is 
Christ’s Easter exaltation and transfiguration, which is effected in the world through the work 
of the Spirit. There is a danger here of reducing theology to objective categories, which fall 
ultimately into the irrationality of being forgetful of mystery—in the sense of maintaining 
that passivity of letting-oneself-be-encountered-by-mystery.  
In response to Kasper, I would suggest that it is a personal relationship of faithfulness 
to Christ amidst suffering that offers what is more a resolution than an answer to the question 
of theodicy. We cannot ultimately put our faith in answers, but rather in the divine person of 
Jesus Christ. Moreover, the person of Christ is more than an answer; Christ is a divine person 
who is beyond proofs, demonstrations, and explanations. We need to question any theodicy 
that is founded merely on logical proofs. Levinas has commented that ‘the disproportion 
between suffering and every theodicy was shown at Auschwitz with a glaring, obvious 
clarity.’
38
 Beyond any answers to the question of human suffering and the existence of God, 
Levinas observes: ‘Auschwitz would paradoxically entail a revelation from the very God who 
                                                 
36
 Ibid., 47. 
37
 See Walter Kasper, The God of Jesus Christ, trans. Matthew J. O’Connell (London: SCM, 
1984), 197. 
38
 Levinas, ‘Useless Suffering,’ in Levinas, Entre Nous, 97. 
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nevertheless was silent at Auschwitz: a commandment of faithfulness.’
39
 In a programmatic 
work reflecting on ‘The Time of Redemption and the Time of Justice,’ and bringing together 
the mysteries of time and the other, he writes: 
 
What produces the thrust of hope is the gravity of the instant in which it occurs. The 
irreparable is its natural atmosphere. There is hope only when hope is longer 
permissible. What is irreparable in the instant of hope is that that instant is a present. 
The future can bring consolation or compensation to a subject who suffers in the 
present, but the very suffering of the present remains like a cry whose echo will 




Levinas wrote this not long after the Second World War. This language of hope is a 
commanding response of faith not only to his time of captivity in a German stalag,
41
 but also 
                                                 
39
 Ibid., 99. 
40
 Levinas. Existence and Existents, 89-90. 
41
 Against his experience of being regarded as a name-less non-existent while in captivity, 
Levinas laments: ‘In horror a subject is stripped of his subjectivity, of his power to have 
private existence. The subject is depersonalised. ‘Nausea,’ as a feeling for existence, is not 
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to Heidegger’s stance in the face of National Socialism.
42
 Ultimately it reflects Levinas’s 




Perhaps Kasper is not so far removed from Levinas’ attempt to forge a language of 
hope and faith in so far as he too is determined to wait on the good amidst an increasingly 
secularised world.
44
 For Kasper, the enlightenment principle that human reason is the 
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measure of all things ultimately ends in abandoning ‘the idea of a specific history of 
salvation.’
45
 As a result, Christology is reduced to anthropology. The danger here affects all 
theology as it can become a victim of its own logic and language. Kasper’s contribution is 
more telling in his transposition of the enlightenment-inspired conception of emancipation to 
the theological context of redemption. The enlightenment gave ultimate value to human 
dignity and freedom. Kasper challenges such a notion of freedom: ‘But surely then the 
enlightenment tradition, which denies God in the name of liberty, contradicts itself in the end. 
How can we conceive reality as existing under the primacy of freedom without a universal 
guarantee of divine freedom?’
46
 So we see how enlightenment logic can end in the irrational, 
when it denies the possibility of the logic of faith. Even though Kasper can also fall victim to 
this irrationality, as we have seen, he is correct in suggesting that there is a need for a second 
enlightenment, a phenomenon that is in its birth pangs today. 
Kasper’s religious quest for Jesus Christ has warned us of the temptation of reducing 
Jesus of Nazareth to a man mythologised. Just as von Balthasar carefully distinguished 
between a theological aesthetics and an aesthetical theology, Kasper, in a perhaps more 
confrontational tone warns of an anthropological Christology. Let us now examine how he 
discusses Christology in relation to anthropology. 
 
Christology with an Anthropological Emphasis  
 
Surprisingly, Kasper begins by praising Rahner’s ‘Christology from below’: 
                                                                                                                                                        
Raymond Brown, S.S., Walter Kasper and Gerald O’Collins, S.J., Faith and the Future: 
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Karl Rahner has done us an immense service in showing how Christology can be 
pursued in a new way on the presuppositions (not the conditions) of the modern 
movement. He has opened a new road to Christian belief for a great number of people 
and has established a bridgehead between Catholic theology and the hermeneutical 




This ‘new way’ engages the subject (in its autonomy), whilst at the same time advocating ‘a 
non-mythological understanding of Christ.’
 48
 Jesus’ humanity is presented as both the 
revelation of God and of the human condition. Although Kasper seems to complement 
Rahner’s analysis, one ought to be careful in taking such praise at face value.  
The fact is that Kasper engages in quite a sophisticated deconstruction of Rahner’s 
transcendental Christology. To this end, he critiques Rahner in three areas: (i) the experience 
of the infinite as the ground of finite freedom and existence; (ii) the experience of fulfilment 
as mediated through history and, in particular, through the salvific-historical event of 
redemption; (iii) transcendence as a dimension to our existence that is continually on the way 
to the revelation of God’s self-communication. 
Rahner’s understanding of human transcendence may be inspiring, but, for Kasper, it 
is reductive. Rahner’s transcendental Christology is a ‘self-transcendent Christology’ to the 
extent of representing ‘the unique fulfilment of anthropology.’
49
 In other words, when 
persons go beyond themselves in experiencing a true Christ-like nature, they experience the 
meaning of their being. Such a position grounds Rahner’s notion of the anonymous Christian 
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in the sense that for every fulfilling experience of human life there is an ‘implicit acceptance’ 
of the Son of Man.
50
 
In spite of Rahner’s logical analysis, the critical questions of human ‘being’ in the 
world have not been answered. ‘We have to ask whether, if we adopt so anthropologically 
oriented a theology and Christology, we are not unilaterally “metaphysicizing” historical 
Christianity, and cancelling by philosophical speculation the scandal of its specific 
reference.’
51
 This could suggest that Kasper is ultimately suspicious of Rahner’s tendency to 
ground theology, not only in anthropology, but also in metaphysics. In a later analysis of 
kenosis-Christology in The God of Jesus Christ, he remarks: 
 
But the attempt to understand God and Jesus Christ in terms of the kenosis idea must 
be antecedently aware that such an understanding must not turn into a wisdom of this 
world but must hold fast to the folly of the message of the cross, which is the wisdom 
of God (cf. I Cor 1:18-31). The point of departure for such an attempt can therefore 
only be the testimony of the Bible and not some philosophy or other, whether 
classical metaphysics with its apathia-axiom, or idealism with its conception of the 
necessary self-renunciation of the absolute, or modern process philosophy. We must 
therefore resist all attempts, anticipated long ago in gnosticism, to turn the cross of 
Christ into a world principle, a world law or a world formula or to explain it as a 
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Kasper’s initial praise is, now, a lament. The passage highlights that Kasper is not only 
critical of transcendental anthropology, but also of such philosophies, as classical 
metaphysics, idealism, and modern process philosophy. Nonetheless, in questioning Rahner’s 
metaphysics, Kasper does not succumb to the danger of falling into an anthropological-
centred Christology, whereby the cross of Christ is misrepresented as a ‘world principle,’ 
rather than the true reality of Christ’s suffering out of love for us.  
Whilst Rahner focuses on the fundamental experience of our human condition in the 
world, Kasper is perhaps more attentive to the limits of human consciousness and 
understanding. Such limits define our human existence in relation to absolute mystery. We 
must face our limits and embrace the mystery of the cross, the very folly of God’s secret and 
hidden wisdom (1 Cor 2:7). 
Kasper may even go as far as questioning Rahner’s theological integrity: ‘This 
constitutive tension between historical reality and transcendental possibility discloses the 
basic problem of Rahner’s approach. We might put it in thesis form by saying that Rahner’s 
approach is still largely within the bounds of the idealistic philosophy of identity and its 
identification of being and consciousness.’
53
 Is Kasper suggesting that we have in Rahner’s 
reasoning a pantheistic, rather than a panentheistic, system? Is it really justifiable for him to 
state that Rahner is forgetful of the transcendental conditions of knowing and unknowing?
54
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According to Kasper, Rahner is forgetful of this structure of knowledge since he focuses 
more on the development of knowledge (its reality as one of becoming) than on its existential 
ground in mystery and enigma (where the truth of human existence converges in Christ).
55
 It 
seems, in Kasper’s mind, that Rahner has fallen into the temptation of confusing human 
consciousness with divine being or human being with divine consciousness.
56
 This tells us 
that, for Kasper, the quest for the meaning of being does not depend first on redeeming 
anthropology, but on the proclamation of faith that Jesus is the Christ. 
It would appear that Kasper’s religious quest for Jesus Christ takes a detour to include 
a demythologizing of Rahner’s theology. Following  from this, we find that Kasper 
emphasises human response and human relations over against Rahner’s emphasis on the 
human person as a question. Despite his later writings, which examine the experience of 
transcendence in history in relation to language, Rahner appears, nevertheless (at least in 
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Kasper’s mind), to be forgetful of the key transcendental conditions of our relating with God 
in history, namely, the limitations of human consciousness and understanding. 
As noted, Kasper sees in Rahner the problems associated with idealism, in which, for 
example, being (God’s being and our being) is over-identified with the categories of 
consciousness, that is to say, God’s divinity is not distinguished clearly enough from our 
humanity. This in turn contributes to the aforementioned anthropological reduction. ‘Is it 
really possible for him [man] as a finite being to conceive the infinite?’
57
 We have here the 




For his part, Kasper acknowledges the problem involved in understanding divine 
consciousness and being: ‘What that infinite really is remains open, ambiguous and 
ambivalent. It can be interpreted in numberless ways.’
59
 We are ultimately left with the fact 
that we too are an image and likeness of God, that is, we too are ‘an impenetrable mystery.’ 
This suggests that we cannot know in complete identity either God or human being. In 
Levinasian terms, this is expressed in the alterity, or otherness, which we encounter in the 
disturbing proximity of our neighbour.
60
 Here the word of God in the other’s face disturbs us 
                                                 
57
 Kasper, Jesus the Christ, 51. 
58
 It is not then surprising that Levinas sets out on a path otherwise than being as a means of 
realizing a transcendent truth in being, namely, peace, justice and mercy (Levinas, Otherwise 
than Being, 16). 
59
 Kasper, Jesus the Christ, 51. 
60
 See Levinas, Basic Philosophical Writings, 80-81. Elsewhere Levinas states: ‘Proximity is 
a disturbance of the rememberable time. One can call that apocalyptically the break-up of 
time. But it is a matter of an effaced but untameable diachrony of non-historical, non-said 
time, which cannot by synchronized in a present by memory and historiography, where the 
 
 26 
as it imposes on the self an unheard-of responsibility, to the point even of overwhelming 
self’s consciousness in the demands placed on it. Levinas will describe this overwhelming 




Acknowledging, finally, the aporia, namely, the problem that cannot be solved, but 
only resolved, Kasper clarifies: ‘The main lines of man’s real nature cannot be produced until 
they reach a certain point called Jesus Christ. … Man has to acknowledge that in Jesus Christ 
everything which he hopes for is indeed fulfilled, but in an ultimately underivable way.’
62
 
Jesus Christ is the resolution of the unsolvable problem of our day. The enlightenment’s 
confidence that ‘all problems can be solved,’ leads to an irrational position, which Kasper 
sees resolved in Jesus Christ. 
 It should be pointed out, of course, that Rahner is aware of the reduction of being to 
consciousness in his Christology. Reflecting on Christology, he warns: ‘To avoid 
misunderstanding, we must note that the Christology outlined above [of the Incarnation and 
God’s relation to the world] is not a “Christology of consciousness” in contrast to an 
ontological Christology affirming the substantial unity of the Logos with his human nature. It 
is based on the metaphysical insight, derived from a strict ontology, that true being is the 
spirit as such itself.’
63
 Nevertheless, Kasper’s suspicions of Rahner’s Christology are not 
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otherwise. Such is the sense of the non-phenomenality of the face’ (Levinas, Otherwise Than 
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without foundation. Moreover, even though Rahner speaks of the danger of mythologizing 
truth, his Christology contains elements of process philosophy / theology. He describes Christ 
as ‘this God-becoming-man’ in such terms as to introduce change into the reality of God, that 
is, in terms of human nature.
64
 Kasper’s criticism of Rahner marks a tendency in Rahner’s 
Christology to give priority to the anthropological reality of the Incarnation over against the 
very personal and relational existence of the Incarnate Logos, and, derivatively, on our part, 
to a personal response to Christ. 
 
The Analogy of Being 
 
In the religious quest for Jesus Christ, Kasper underlines the importance of the very 
assent of faith, that is not just implicit: ‘Man has to acknowledge that in Jesus Christ 
everything which he hopes for is indeed fulfilled.’
65
 The ‘has to,’ muß in the original text, 
implies an ultimate responsibility for accepting faith in Christ. Hence, against Rahner, Kasper 
highlights a new relationship between Christology and anthropology: one that uses the logic 
of the analogy of being (analogia entis), namely, that for every similarity between God and 
the human person, there is a greater dissimilarity. ‘In the sense of the classical notion of 
analogy, we have to say that however great the similarity between anthropology and 
Christology, the dissimilarity is still greater.’
66
 We thus find that the analogy of being gives a 
structure to the relationship between anthropology and Christology. This is not new, as von 
Balthasar has already presented this very issue in his trilogy on aesthetics, dramatics, and 
logic. 
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Kasper goes further, stating that ‘anthropology is so to speak the grammar which God 
uses to express himself. But the grammar as such is still available for a great number of 
pronouncements. It is concretely decided only through the actual human life of Jesus.’
 67
 
Accordingly, we have the important statement of faith that Christ is the analogia entis par 
excellence. As pointed out, this is the same position held by von Balthasar. Christ, as the 
ultimate analogy of being, is the one in whom we find the meaning and truth of our human 
existence. This might suggest that Rahner’s Christology is forgetful of the Christological 
implications of the analogy of being. 
It is now not unexpected that Kasper favours the theology of Hans Urs von Balthasar, 
a theologian whose influence no doubt permeates his thought. With von Balthasar, Kasper 
introduces the category of the ‘New’ in the sense that we cannot limit the event of Jesus 
Christ to a specific time in history. The Christ event cannot be limited to just one instance in 
time or to one meaning; in fact its meaning permeates all time and every human heart. Its 
meaning is dependent on (divine) being, rather than on human knowledge. We can begin to 
see things as truly historical when we realise that, like Mary, we too can have a share in 
Christ’s mission and life, and realise that the quest for salvation is an important source of 




The Quest for Salvation in an Historicized World  
 
In the spirit of Vatican II, Kasper analyses the transition in Catholic theology from 
having a static view of reality towards having a more dynamic and evolutionary one. The 
danger of the quest for Jesus Christ today is that of falling into a search for a ‘temporal well 
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being which we ourselves plan, organise, devise and fight for.’
69
 Such a quest for human 
well-being has indeed taken a hedonistic and narcissistic turn with the increasing wealth of 
society. In contrast, a philosophical and theological quest for the absolute (for redemption 
and salvation) goes deeper in the search for meaning and truth.
70
 From a Levinasian 
perspective, however, I would argue that God does not have to safeguard the truth against a 
hedonistic and narcissistic distortion of it. The nature of divine truth is infinite and is 




In order to investigate the meaning of Christ’s being for our historical situation, 
Kasper begins with the question: ‘What is history?’
 72
 He responds: ‘There is history only 
where there is freedom.’
 73
 Freedom is the human spirit bestowing its meaning on our 
existence. Our human spirit develops an ‘inner sense of history and understanding of time,’
 74
 
that complements external time and history. History is relational, ‘a process of reciprocity 
between subject and object,’
75
 and is the foundation of experience and meaning in the world. 
The issue, for Kasper, is how we might continue to speak ‘about God and something absolute 
inside that kind of historical framework of thought?’
76
 Repeatedly we find Kasper searching 
for a rational way of speaking of God in relation to history and the secular world. As a 
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response to the search for a logic of faith in history, Kasper offers arguments from three 




Kasper emphasises that all our knowledge is in the sphere of the infinite. If we ignore 
the infinite we are left only with facts (the facticity of our historical situation) and, hence, live 
separated from the truth. Acknowledgement of the infinite offers humanity space for 
‘freedom, decision and venture.’
77
 Humanity is greater than the facts of our historical reality 
because of our relationship to God. Granted that the reality of our existence restricts us to the 
fact of living in the world (facticity), we, nevertheless, have a chance for freedom because of 
our relationship to the infinite. Thus we are caught between power and impotence, grandeur 
and poverty, or, transcendence and the limits of facticity.  
Examining our existential state, Kasper introduces the theme of suffering. Our 
poverty is an experience of suffering. We suffer because we always already have an inkling 
of our greatness that is ultimately the possibility of relating to God. The very possibility of 
transcendence underlines for us that we can never truly reduce God to the totality of 
knowledge. It further points to the human person as an impenetrable mystery. The human 
person cannot be grasped or sufficiently explained through an objective knowledge.
78
 
‘Freedom as the transcendental definition or determination of human beings is not something 
that is factually “given”. It cannot be objectively established and proved.’
79
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‘How is human existence possible in this aporetic historical situation?’
80
 In such 
words, Kasper asks how we are to live in a world in which we cannot find ultimately a 
rational answer for our existence. This is the perennial tragedy wherein we must discover 
meaning and truth. In its own terms, anthropology cannot give the final word on the meaning 
of our existence. But we can find a ‘resolution’ in God who is infinite truth. Kasper’s quest 
for the meaning of divine being takes a turn towards the notion of freedom. In a 
complementary manner, for Levinas, the way of truth is directed to a life of difficult freedom, 
namely, having to take responsibility even in situations of humiliation and persecution. 
Levinas will speak, therefore, of a ‘persecuted truth’ in a manner that is distant from the idea 
of truth as unconcealedness (Heidegger), or as presence in consciousness. The transcendent 
power of truth is experienced in being exposed to the destitution of the other. It is found in 
the trace or proximity of God in the other’s face. In this formulation Levinas wishes to 






Kasper’s second viewpoint, in developing a rational way of speaking of God, 
highlights the phenomenon of evil as a means to refine his reflection on existence. The 
existence of evil is ‘an impenetrable mystery.’
82
 Philosophies have struggled to respond 
adequately to the problem of evil. Equally theology is confronted with the problem of 
theodicy, of trying to explain why there is a God and why there is evil. Kasper comments 
firstly on the facticity or existence of evil. He notes that evil is part of the being of human 
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history and freedom, and, indeed, characterises it as a ‘perversion of being: as the perversion 
of the meaning of existence.’
83
 Next he qualifies it in terms of the reality of being: ‘Evil is 
either the humiliation or the violation of man.’
84
 Hence, if we separate being into the two 
categories of existence and reality, we find two modes of evil: (i) evil as a perversion of 
existence; and (ii) evil as absolute meaninglessness.
85
 
It is not possible to easily come to terms with the existence and reality of evil.
86
 
Furthermore, even in pitting ourselves against evil and injustice we may be wounded by its 
power. Our suffering in the name of justice, for example, can turn into bitterness, hatred, and 
revenge. Only the God of redemption can save us. Such faith-inspired knowledge of 
redemption means that at the very moment when all might appear to be lost, everything is, in 
fact, possible.
87
 Such hope is beyond the ground of history; it is forged in the meaning of 












 In contrast, Levinas goes a step further: ‘Evil as an excess, evil as an intention; there is also 
a third moment in this phenomenology: evil as hatred of evil. … The experience of evil 
would then be also our waiting on the good – the love of God’ (Levinas, Collected 
Philosophical Papers, 183). 
86
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themselves like phantoms’ (Levinas, Existence and Existents, 61). 
87
 See Ibid., 92. 
88
 Kasper, Jesus the Christ, 55-6. 
 
 33 
We now come to the third viewpoint in Kasper’s logic of giving a rational basis for 
faith in Jesus Christ. The first two underlined that, given finite existence and evil, history 
cannot find fulfilment from within its own parameters. Despite this, however, a new logos is 
possible, if we direct ourselves towards the Logos, that is the Father’s Word of salvation in 
the person of Jesus Christ: the truth that ‘Jesus is the Christ.’ 
To arrive at this insight, we have to realize that an individuation, perhaps even a 
super-individuation is possible, in which through the ‘phenomenon of self-transcendence’ we 
become a new person in Christ. This transformation signifies becoming ‘more’ like Christ, 
and, in this, ‘the achievement of a greater fullness of being.’
89
 We find, thus, the centre of 
Kasper’s search for a logic of faith in the dynamic of transcendence. Self-transcendence is an 
opening to the infinity of divine being.
90
 This, in turn, opens the path that leads to hope, 
fulfilment, and ultimate meaning beyond the limitations of history. 
 
Conclusion: The Quest for Jesus Christ Today  
 
‘The compelling and convincing aspect of Jesus Christ is that in him both the 
greatness and the inadequacy of mankind are accepted, and accepted infinitely. In that sense, 
Jesus Christ is the fulfilment of history.’
91
 This suggests, to Kasper, that in our historicized 
world, an ultimate reason can be encountered in the grace of Christ’s salvific love and 
acceptance. We can be transformed and so uncover a hope for ultimate meaning in an act of 
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faith in the person of Jesus Christ.
92
 The more we participate with others in becoming like 
Christ in humility and solidarity, the more we can experience the truth of our freedom and of 
our existence. Our finite condition and the problem of evil are but obstacles to be negotiated 
as we move beyond the limits of our own being towards the otherness of divine being. We are 
to witness to the wisdom that Jesus is the Christ. In the hope of witnessing to such glory, we 
might truly discover ourselves in turning to Jesus Christ and asking: ‘Are you he who is to 
come, or shall we look for another? (Mt 11:3).’
93
 
The proclamation that Jesus is the Christ and Son of God is one that needs to be 
renewed for those who remain deaf and blind to the possibility of freedom and redemption 
through Jesus. Whilst on a philosophical level we may be unable to find the definitive answer 
to the question of the meaning of being, we may, on a theological level, begin to discern a 
response to the above question from Matthew’s gospel in the realization that Jesus is the 
Christ. At the end of modernity, Kasper has opened a new path for us in responding in faith.  
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